How Omitting 'The' in UN Resolution 242 Left Post-1967 Borders Negotiable

A single missing three-letter word in a 292-word document has defined the borders of the Middle East for nearly 60 years. On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, aiming to establish a framework for peace following the Six-Day War.[1][2]

Instead of settling the region's boundaries, the text created a structural ambiguity that remains unresolved today. The English version of the resolution called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from "territories occupied" during the conflict. It deliberately omitted the word "the" before "territories."[1][4]

That omission was not a typographical error. British diplomat Lord Caradon, who drafted the resolution, engineered the phrasing to ensure that Israel would not be forced to return to its vulnerable pre-1967 borders. The text required withdrawal, but left the exact lines subject to future negotiation.[3][4]

However, the United Nations operates in multiple official languages, and the French translation of the text carried equal legal weight. The French version mandated withdrawal from "des territoires occupés," which translates to "from the occupied territories." That linguistic collision birthed two entirely different legal realities.[4]

The Six-Day War and the UN Response

The diplomatic scramble that produced Resolution 242 began in the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Over the course of six days, the geopolitical map of the Middle East was fundamentally redrawn as Israel defeated the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.[2]

By the time the guns fell silent, Israeli forces had captured five distinct landmasses. They held the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The territory under Israeli control had more than tripled in size.

The international community faced an immediate crisis. The United Nations Security Council spent five months debating how to reverse the territorial expansion while ensuring that Israel would not face another coordinated invasion. Five different draft resolutions were proposed and discarded before the British delegation presented a compromise.[4]

The resulting document, Resolution 242, introduced the "land-for-peace" formula. It rested on two interlocking principles: Israeli withdrawal from occupied land, and the termination of all states of belligerency. In exchange for territory, Arab states would have to acknowledge Israel's sovereignty and its right to live in peace.[1]

The resolution also emphasized the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." This preamble clause became a central pillar of international law regarding the conflict. Yet the operative clauses that followed contained the deliberate vagueness necessary to secure a unanimous 15-0 vote in the Security Council.[1][4]

The Missing Definite Article

The core of the dispute lies in Operative Paragraph One, which outlines the withdrawal requirement. The authoritative English text calls for the "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." The absence of the definite article "the" or the word "all" was a calculated diplomatic maneuver.[1][3]

Lord Caradon and American diplomats argued that the 1949 armistice lines, which separated the combatants before June 5, 1967, were merely where the fighting had stopped two decades earlier. They did not constitute defensible international borders. Forcing Israel back to those exact lines would invite future wars.[3]

"It would have been impossible to get the resolution through if either of these words had been included," Lord Caradon later explained in a 1970 interview. He noted that the resolution required withdrawal to "secure and recognized boundaries," which meant the final lines had to be negotiated, not dictated by the UN.[3]

Arthur Goldberg, the United States Ambassador to the UN in 1967, reinforced this interpretation. He stated that the omission of "the" and "all" meant the resolution "neither commands nor prohibits total withdrawal." The exact depth of the Israeli pullback was left intentionally undefined to force the parties to the negotiating table.[3][4]

Under this English-language interpretation, Israel could fulfill its obligations under Resolution 242 by withdrawing from some, but not necessarily all, of the captured land. This reading provided the legal foundation for Israel to retain control over strategic areas while trading other territories for formal peace treaties.[4]

The French Translation Clash

The diplomatic triumph of the English draft immediately collided with the realities of international law. At the United Nations, English and French were both working languages of the Security Council. Consequently, the French translation of Resolution 242 was not a secondary document; it was an equally authentic text.[4]

The French version of the withdrawal clause reads: "retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit." In French grammar, "des" is a contraction of "de" and "les," meaning "from the." Therefore, the French text explicitly calls for withdrawal from "the occupied territories."[4]

Arab diplomats and Palestinian representatives seized upon the French text. They argued that the inclusion of the definite article, combined with the preamble's ban on acquiring territory by war, mandated a complete and total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines. Anything less, they maintained, violated the resolution.[4]

This linguistic discrepancy allowed both sides to claim the backing of international law. Israel and the United States pointed to the English text to justify border modifications and the retention of certain settlements. Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and later the Palestine Liberation Organization, pointed to the French text to demand every inch of land back.

Legal scholars have debated the discrepancy for decades. Some argue that when two authentic texts conflict, the language of the original draft—in this case, English—should take precedence. Others contend that the French text aligns more closely with the resolution's preamble regarding the inadmissibility of territorial conquest.[4][5]

Chapter VI and the Need for Negotiation

Beyond the linguistic debate, the legal weight of Resolution 242 is defined by the specific mechanism under which it was adopted. The Security Council passed the measure under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, which deals with the "pacific settlement of disputes."[4]

Unlike Chapter VII resolutions, which address threats to global peace and can authorize economic sanctions or military force, Chapter VI resolutions are not self-enforcing. They serve as authoritative recommendations and frameworks for negotiation. Resolution 242 could not unilaterally move a single border post.[5]

Because it was a Chapter VI resolution, the text explicitly called on the UN Secretary-General to appoint a special representative to "promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." The resolution required the active participation and mutual consent of the warring parties.[1][2]

Following the adoption of the resolution, UN Secretary-General U Thant appointed Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring as his special representative. The Jarring Mission spent years shuttling between Middle Eastern capitals, attempting to operationalize the vague text. The mission ultimately collapsed because the parties could not agree on which clause of Resolution 242 took precedence.[5]

This structural reality meant that Israel was not obligated to withdraw unilaterally. The withdrawal was legally tethered to the second half of the formula: the Arab states' recognition of Israel's right to exist within secure boundaries. Neither side could achieve its primary goal without negotiating directly with the other.[3]

The Legacy of Land for Peace

Despite its inherent contradictions, Resolution 242 became the inescapable foundation of all subsequent Middle East diplomacy. Every major peace initiative over the next half-century invoked its principles. The resolution transformed from a ceasefire mechanism into the definitive blueprint for regional stability.

The formula achieved its first breakthrough in 1979, when Egypt and Israel signed a historic peace treaty. Relying on the framework of Resolution 242, Israel withdrew completely from the Sinai Peninsula. In exchange, Egypt became the first Arab nation to formally recognize the State of Israel and end the state of belligerency.

In 1993, the resolution anchored the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO formally accepted Resolution 242, implicitly recognizing Israel's right to exist, while Israel acknowledged the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The following year, Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty based on the same text.

Syria initially rejected the resolution entirely, arguing that it rewarded Israeli aggression. It was not until after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the Security Council passed Resolution 338 calling for the immediate implementation of 242, that Damascus conditionally accepted the framework. However, the Golan Heights remain under Israeli control today.

Yet the core ambiguity regarding the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights remains unresolved. The missing definite article in the English text continues to provide the legal rationale for Israel's ongoing administration of those territories, while the French text fuels demands for a total withdrawal.[4]

A document designed to force a compromise instead formalized a permanent dispute. By attempting to satisfy everyone through linguistic vagueness, the drafters of Resolution 242 ensured that the exact borders of the Middle East would remain contested, negotiated, and fought over for generations to come.[4][5]