Evidence Pack: Evaluating Claims That Ranked-Choice Voting Reduces Political Polarization

The mechanics of democracy are undergoing one of their most significant shifts in a century. Across the United States, more than 50 jurisdictions—including major cities and entire states like Maine and Alaska—have abandoned traditional plurality elections in favor of ranked-choice voting (RCV). In this system, voters do not simply select one candidate; they rank multiple candidates in order of preference. If no candidate secures an outright majority of first-choice votes, the lowest-performing candidate is eliminated, and their voters' second choices are redistributed. This instant-runoff process continues until one candidate crosses the 50 percent threshold, fundamentally altering the math of how a politician wins an election.[3]

Proponents of the system have long argued that this mechanical change produces a profound psychological shift in how campaigns are run. The central claim is that RCV reduces negative campaigning and political polarization. Because candidates often need to rely on being the second or third choice of their opponents' supporters to secure a mathematical majority, the incentive to launch scorched-earth attack ads theoretically diminishes. Alienating a rival's base could cost a candidate the crucial backup votes needed to survive the later rounds of tabulation. For voters exhausted by toxic election cycles, this promise of structural civility is highly appealing.[3]

To evaluate whether this claim holds up to empirical scrutiny, political scientists have spent the last decade analyzing campaign tone in cities that have adopted the reform. Research from the Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics provides some of the strongest evidence that the tone genuinely shifts. In surveys comparing RCV cities to non-RCV cities, voters in jurisdictions using the ranked system consistently reported experiencing less negative campaigning. Furthermore, candidates themselves reported spending less time criticizing opponents and more time engaging directly with voters on substantive policy issues.[1][3]

The data suggests that this is not merely a change in perception, but a change in campaign strategy. In several high-profile mayoral races utilizing RCV, candidates have engaged in cross-endorsements—publicly asking voters to rank them first, and a specific rival second. This collaborative campaigning is virtually non-existent in traditional plurality elections, where any support given to a rival is a zero-sum loss. By creating a mathematical benefit for coalition-building, the system forces candidates to appeal to a broader swath of the electorate rather than simply turning out a narrow, highly partisan base.[1]

Beyond campaign tone, economists and political scientists have examined whether RCV actually reduces ideological polarization among elected officials. A comprehensive working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research analyzed candidate positioning across multiple election cycles. The findings indicate that RCV exerts a moderating force on candidate platforms. Because extreme candidates struggle to secure second-choice votes from the broader electorate, they are mathematically disadvantaged in the instant-runoff process. As a result, the system tends to reward consensus candidates who may not be the passionate first choice of a vocal minority, but are broadly acceptable to the majority.[2][3]

Alaska's recent statewide elections serve as a primary case study for this moderating effect. Following the state's adoption of a top-four open primary combined with a ranked-choice general election, the resulting representation defied traditional partisan expectations. The system allowed a coalition of moderate lawmakers to form a bipartisan governing majority in the state legislature, and it facilitated the election of consensus candidates who appealed to the political center. Analysts noted that under a traditional closed primary system, these same candidates likely would have been defeated by more ideologically extreme challengers who appeal to the party base.

However, the evidence is not uniformly positive, and researchers highlight several areas of transparent uncertainty. The most significant weakness in the RCV model is a phenomenon known as "ballot exhaustion." This occurs when a voter chooses to rank only one or two candidates, and those candidates are eliminated early in the tabulation process. If the voter's ballot does not include any of the candidates who make it to the final round, their vote is "exhausted" and does not factor into the final majority calculation. Critics argue that this can lead to a "false majority," where the winning candidate secures 50 percent of the remaining ballots, but not 50 percent of the total ballots originally cast.[3]

Data on ballot exhaustion shows that it is a real, measurable factor, particularly in races with a large number of candidates. On average, competitive RCV races see an exhaustion rate of around 9 percent, though this number can spike higher in highly fragmented fields. Electoral reform advocates argue that this is still an improvement over traditional plurality elections, where a candidate can win outright with 35 or 40 percent of the vote if the field is crowded. Nevertheless, the exhaustion rate indicates that the system's promise of guaranteeing a true majority mandate is mathematically imperfect.[2]

Another area of evaluation is voter comprehension and satisfaction. A common argument against RCV is that it is too complex and confuses the electorate. Polling data from the Pew Research Center provides a nuanced view of this claim. While initial implementation often faces a learning curve, voter comprehension rises rapidly after the first election cycle. In jurisdictions that have used RCV for multiple cycles, overwhelming majorities of voters report that the ballot is easy to understand and that they prefer the ranked system over the traditional method. The data suggests that complexity is a short-term hurdle rather than a permanent barrier.[3]

Interestingly, the evidence regarding voter turnout is mixed. While some early studies suggested that RCV might dramatically boost turnout by giving voters more choices, comprehensive analyses have found only a modest, sometimes statistically insignificant, impact on overall participation rates. Turnout appears to be driven more by the competitiveness of the race and the broader political climate than by the mechanics of the ballot itself. However, researchers note that RCV does eliminate the steep drop-off in turnout that typically plagues traditional, separate runoff elections held weeks after a general election.

The impact of RCV on the two-party system is another area of active study. Third-party and independent candidates are among the strongest supporters of the reform, as it eliminates the "spoiler effect"—the fear that voting for a third-party candidate will inadvertently help a voter's least favorite major-party candidate win. Evidence shows that third-party candidates do receive a higher percentage of first-choice votes under RCV. However, they still rarely win executive offices, as the second-choice votes of their supporters typically flow back to the major-party candidates in the final rounds of tabulation.[2]

Despite these nuances, the aggregate evidence strongly supports the claim that ranked-choice voting alters the incentive structures of political campaigns. By making coalition-building mathematically necessary, the system demonstrably reduces the prevalence of negative campaigning and provides a structural advantage to consensus-oriented candidates. While it is not a panacea for all democratic dysfunction, and challenges like ballot exhaustion remain, the data indicates that RCV successfully delivers on its core promise of rewarding broader appeal over narrow polarization.[1][2][3]