The Evidence Pack: How US Intelligence Projects the 2035 Hypersonic Missile Threat

In March 2026, the U.S. Intelligence Community released a sweeping assessment projecting that the number of missile threats capable of reaching the American homeland will quintuple over the next decade. According to testimony from Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, the collective adversary arsenal is expected to expand from roughly 3,000 missiles today to more than 16,000 by 2035. This projection, rooted in a May 2025 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, marks a fundamental shift in the global strategic landscape. Rather than a simple numerical increase in traditional intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the intelligence data points to a qualitative revolution driven by hypersonic technologies and novel delivery systems designed to evade existing early-warning radars.[1][2][3]

The foundation of this assessment is the DIA's "Golden Dome" report, which categorizes incoming threats across six domains: ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS), and two classes of hypersonic weapons. While traditional ICBMs remain the backbone of nuclear deterrence—with China projected to grow its ICBM inventory from 400 to 700 by 2035—the most dramatic expansion is occurring in the hypersonic sector. These systems represent a paradigm shift in aerospace engineering, combining the speed of ballistic missiles with the maneuverability of cruise missiles.[2][3][4]

Hypersonic weapons are defined by their ability to travel and sustain flight at speeds exceeding Mach 5—roughly 3,800 miles per hour, or one mile per second. However, speed alone is not their defining military characteristic; traditional ICBMs also reach hypersonic velocities as they re-enter the atmosphere. The critical innovation of modern hypersonic systems is their endo-atmospheric maneuverability. By flying at lower altitudes than ballistic missiles and altering their trajectories mid-flight, they compress the decision-making timeline for missile defense operators and render traditional parabolic tracking algorithms obsolete.[1][3]

The intelligence projections indicate that China is leading the global expansion of these maneuverable systems. According to the DIA assessment, China's inventory of boosted hypersonic weapons—which includes both aero-ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs)—is projected to surge from approximately 600 systems today to 4,000 by 2035. Russia, which has already deployed systems like the Avangard HGV, is projected to increase its boosted hypersonic arsenal from an estimated 200–300 systems to 1,000 over the same period.[1][2][4]

The mechanics of a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) illustrate why these systems are driving changes in defense architecture. An HGV is initially launched atop a conventional rocket booster, similar to a standard ballistic missile. However, instead of arcing deep into space, the glide vehicle detaches in the upper atmosphere. It then uses the aerodynamic forces of its own shockwaves to "skip" or glide along the edge of the atmosphere, steering toward its target at extreme velocities. This flight path keeps the weapon below the horizon of traditional ground-based early warning radars for much of its journey.[1][3][4]

Alongside HGVs, adversaries are heavily investing in Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) and advanced Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). Unlike HGVs, which rely on a rocket booster for initial velocity, HCMs are powered throughout their flight by advanced air-breathing engines known as scramjets. The DIA projects that both China and Russia will expand their LACM inventories to roughly 5,000 each by 2035. These systems can be launched from air, land, or sea platforms, allowing adversaries to initiate strikes from multiple unpredictable vectors.[1][2][3][4]

The intelligence community is also tracking the revival of a Cold War-era concept: the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). A FOBS operates by launching a payload into a low-Earth orbit, allowing it to transit the globe before decelerating and re-entering the atmosphere to strike a target. Because a FOBS does not follow a predictable ballistic arc, it can theoretically approach the United States from the south, bypassing the network of early-warning radars that are primarily oriented toward the North Pole. While neither nation currently fields a large FOBS arsenal, the DIA projects China could field up to 60 such systems by 2035.[2][4]

Evaluating the strength of these projections requires understanding how the intelligence community forecasts decade-long procurement trends. Analysts rely on a combination of satellite imagery tracking the expansion of solid-rocket motor production facilities, intercepted telemetry from weapons tests, and open-source analysis of adversary defense budgets. The rapid construction of new missile silo fields and the observed frequency of hypersonic flight tests provide the empirical baseline for the 2035 numbers.[1][2]

However, defense researchers note that long-term intelligence projections carry inherent uncertainty. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) points out that previous threat assessments have occasionally overstated the speed of adversary development. For example, the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission assessed that rogue states could field ICBMs within five years—a timeline that ultimately took nearly two decades to materialize in the case of North Korea. Projections out to 2035 assume that adversaries will not face economic constraints, supply chain disruptions, or engineering bottlenecks in mass-producing complex hypersonic materials.[1][3]

In response to this projected asymmetry, the United States is fundamentally restructuring its missile defense architecture through the "Golden Dome" initiative. Proposed with a $25 billion initial allocation for fiscal year 2026, the initiative aims to transition the U.S. from a limited defense posture—designed primarily to intercept a handful of rogue-state ICBMs—to a layered, hemispheric shield capable of tracking and defeating maneuverable hypersonic threats.[2][3]

The cornerstone of this defensive shift is the move from ground-based radar to space-based sensor networks. Because hypersonic vehicles fly too low for traditional space-tracking radars and too high for standard air-defense systems, they exist in a sensor gap. To close this gap, the Missile Defense Agency and the Space Development Agency are deploying the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). Operating in low-Earth orbit, HBTSS satellites use advanced infrared sensors to detect the intense thermal signature generated by a hypersonic vehicle's friction with the atmosphere, maintaining a continuous track as the weapon maneuvers.[2]

Simultaneously, the U.S. military is fielding its own offensive hypersonic capabilities to maintain strategic deterrence. The U.S. Army is deploying the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), formally designated "Dark Eagle," which completed end-to-end flight tests and is positioned for operational fielding. Capable of striking targets at ranges exceeding 1,700 miles, the LRHW provides combatant commanders with a highly survivable, rapid-response strike option.

A critical distinction in the emerging hypersonic arms race is the difference in payload doctrine. The United States has maintained a strict policy of developing only conventionally armed hypersonic weapons, intended for precision strikes against high-value tactical targets. In contrast, intelligence assessments indicate that Russian and Chinese hypersonic systems are dual-capable, meaning they can be armed with either conventional explosives or nuclear warheads. This ambiguity complicates escalation management, as defense systems cannot immediately determine the nature of an incoming hypersonic payload.[1]

The ultimate challenge of the 2035 projection is economic. Hypersonic interceptors are highly complex and expensive to manufacture. If adversaries can mass-produce thousands of boosted hypersonic weapons and pair them with cheaper, expendable unmanned aerial vehicles to saturate defenses, the cost-exchange ratio heavily favors the attacker. To counter this, the U.S. defense industry is heavily researching directed energy weapons, microwave defenses, and cheaper, modular interceptors that can be produced at scale.[1][3]

The intelligence community's 2035 projection serves as both a warning and a catalyst. While the sheer volume of the projected 16,000-missile threat is daunting, it has successfully triggered a rapid acceleration in U.S. space-based tracking, advanced materials science, and integrated air and missile defense. By understanding the precise mechanics of hypersonic flight and the evidence behind adversary production capabilities, defense planners are actively engineering the technologies required to maintain stability in the next era of aerospace deterrence.[1][2]