The End of Arms Control: How New START's Expiration Rewrites the Nuclear Security Landscape

On February 5, 2026, the global nuclear security architecture crossed a historic threshold. For the first time since the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972, the United States and Russia are operating without a legally binding treaty capping their strategic nuclear arsenals. The expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) did not trigger an immediate crisis, but it fundamentally rewired the rules of global deterrence.[2]

Signed in 2010, New START was the bedrock of modern arms control. It restricted both nations to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 deployed delivery vehicles—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. More importantly, it established a rigorous regime of transparency that allowed both nations to verify compliance.[2][5]

Under the treaty, Washington and Moscow exchanged thousands of data points annually regarding the status and location of their nuclear forces. They conducted short-notice, on-site inspections of each other's military bases and shared telemetry data from missile tests. This verification mechanism ensured that neither side had to rely on worst-case scenario planning when assessing the other's capabilities.[2]

The path to expiration was gradual. In early 2023, Russia suspended its formal participation in the treaty's inspection regime, citing geopolitical tensions, though it pledged to continue abiding by the numerical caps. As the February 2026 expiration date approached, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a one-year informal extension of the limits, albeit without restoring the verification protocols.

The United States did not formally accept the offer, arguing that a bilateral freeze without verification was insufficient. Furthermore, U.S. policymakers across multiple administrations had increasingly viewed the bilateral framework itself as obsolete. The primary catalyst for this shift in perspective was the rapid and opaque expansion of China's nuclear capabilities.[3]

For decades, China maintained a "minimum deterrence" posture with a relatively small arsenal of a few hundred warheads. However, recent assessments by the U.S. Department of Defense indicate a dramatic breakout. China's stockpile grew from the low 200s in 2020 to over 600 by 2026, with projections suggesting it could reach 1,000 warheads by 2030.[1]

This unprecedented growth created a "three-peer" dilemma for U.S. defense planners. Washington argued that it could no longer afford to legally bind its forces to parity with Russia while China built up its arsenal unconstrained. The U.S. State Department articulated that any future arms control framework must be multilateral, bringing Beijing to the negotiating table.[1][3]

China, however, has consistently rejected invitations to join nuclear arms control talks. Beijing argues that the United States and Russia—which together still hold roughly 90% of the world's total nuclear weapons, with over 5,000 warheads each—bear the primary responsibility for disarmament. From China's perspective, joining a treaty before the superpowers reduce their arsenals to Chinese levels would permanently lock in a strategic disadvantage.[5]

In the absence of a new treaty, the immediate concern among arms control experts is the concept of "uploading." While New START limited deployed warheads, both the U.S. and Russia maintain thousands of non-deployed reserve warheads in storage. Without legal caps, either nation could quickly attach these reserve warheads to existing missiles that currently carry fewer warheads than their maximum capacity.[1][2]

Uploading represents the fastest route to a renewed arms race. If Washington decides to upload warheads to deter a combined threat from Russia and China, Moscow is likely to respond in kind to maintain parity. Because military procurement is slow, this competition would play out through the rapid reconfiguration of existing systems rather than the immediate construction of new missiles.[1][4]

The expiration of New START also has profound implications for the broader international community. Under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), recognized nuclear-weapon states are legally obligated to pursue disarmament in good faith. The collapse of the last bilateral cap has fueled frustration among non-nuclear states, who argue that the major powers are failing their NPT commitments.[5]

Organizations like the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) emphasize that the end of New START should not mean the end of diplomacy. They advocate for a shift away from merely managing arsenals toward comprehensive disarmament frameworks, warning that the current trajectory normalizes the perpetual existence of nuclear threats.[5]

Despite the lack of a formal treaty, a fragile informal restraint currently holds. Both Washington and Moscow have indicated they are not rushing to exceed the old New START limits immediately. However, without the data exchanges and inspections that characterized the past decade, this restraint relies entirely on national technical means—such as satellite surveillance—and mutual guesswork.

The nuclear security landscape of late 2026 is defined by this ambiguity. The era of bilateral, highly verified arms control has given way to a complex, multipolar deterrence environment. Policymakers are now tasked with developing new mechanisms for strategic stability and crisis communication that do not rely on the rigid, legally binding treaties of the past half-century.[4]