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Executive PayRegulatory ShiftAug 10, 2026, 8:26 AM· 3 min read

SEC Proposes Ending Say-on-Pay and Compensation Disclosure for 81% of Public Companies

A sweeping new SEC proposal would reclassify the vast majority of U.S. public companies as non-accelerated filers, exempting them from mandatory shareholder votes on executive pay and significantly reducing reporting burdens.

By Madison Lane

Regulatory & Capital Formation Advocates 40%Institutional Investors 30%Corporate Compensation Committees 30%
Regulatory & Capital Formation Advocates
Proponents arguing that reducing disclosure burdens is essential to keeping U.S. public markets competitive.
Institutional Investors
Governance watchdogs warning that the loss of standardized pay data will hinder their ability to evaluate corporate leadership.
Corporate Compensation Committees
Advisors focused on the strategic dilemma boards face over whether to voluntarily maintain current disclosures.

Fast facts

  • The SEC has proposed consolidating its filing categories, reclassifying companies with a public float below $2 billion as Non-Accelerated Filers (NAFs).
  • Approximately 81% of publicly traded companies would qualify as NAFs under the new framework.
  • NAFs would be exempt from holding mandatory say-on-pay votes and publishing a Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) narrative.
  • The 19% of companies that remain Large Accelerated Filers (LAFs) represent 93.5% of the total U.S. public market float and will see no disclosure changes.

Why this matters

For thousands of mid-sized and newly public companies, the rule change promises a dramatic reduction in compliance costs and proxy season complexity. However, it forces boards to decide whether to voluntarily maintain transparency to satisfy institutional investors who rely on standardized pay data.

On May 19, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposed a sweeping regulatory overhaul that would exempt approximately 81% of publicly traded companies from holding mandatory "say-on-pay" shareholder votes.[1][2]

The proposed rulemaking represents the most significant shift in public company reporting requirements in two decades. By redefining how the agency categorizes issuers, the SEC aims to dramatically reduce the executive compensation disclosure burden for thousands of mid-sized and newly public firms.[3][6]

At the core of the proposal is a simplification of the SEC's filing tiers. The current system, which sorts companies into five overlapping categories based on revenue and public float, would be consolidated into just two: Large Accelerated Filers (LAFs) and Non-Accelerated Filers (NAFs).[2][5]

Under the new framework, any company with a public float below $2 billion would be classified as an NAF. For these newly minted NAFs, the compliance relief is substantial. They would no longer be required to hold advisory votes on executive compensation, the frequency of those votes, or golden parachute arrangements during mergers and acquisitions.[5][6]

Under the proposal, roughly four in five public companies would qualify for scaled-back disclosure requirements.
Under the proposal, roughly four in five public companies would qualify for scaled-back disclosure requirements.

The disclosure reductions extend deep into the annual proxy statement. NAFs would be exempt from publishing a Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) narrative, a detailed section that often spans dozens of pages to explain the philosophy behind executive payouts.[1][4]

The disclosure reductions extend deep into the annual proxy statement.

Furthermore, these companies would no longer need to calculate and disclose their CEO pay ratio or the complex "pay versus performance" tables introduced in recent years. Historical compensation reporting would be scaled back to cover only three named executive officers over a two-year period, rather than five officers over three years.[1][7]

Despite the broad applicability of the rule—affecting roughly 4,300 companies—the SEC emphasized that the macroeconomic impact is highly concentrated. The 19% of companies that would remain LAFs represent 93.5% of the total U.S. public market float, meaning the S&P 500 and most of the S&P 400 would continue to face the full disclosure regime.[3][7]

While the vast majority of companies would see relief, the largest firms representing 93.5% of market float remain subject to full disclosure.
While the vast majority of companies would see relief, the largest firms representing 93.5% of market float remain subject to full disclosure.

The Commission framed the deregulatory action as a necessary step to enhance capital formation. By lowering the ongoing compliance costs associated with being a public company, the SEC hopes to encourage more initial public offerings and reverse a long-term decline in the number of listed domestic firms.[2][6]

However, the proposal sets up a potential clash between regulatory minimums and investor expectations. Institutional investors and proxy advisory firms have spent the last decade building sophisticated governance models that rely heavily on the standardized data provided in CD&As and say-on-pay votes.[4][5]

Without a dedicated say-on-pay ballot item, investors dissatisfied with executive compensation packages may resort to voting against the reelection of compensation committee members—a binding and potentially more disruptive mechanism for expressing discontent.[1][4]

For newly public companies, the rules would effectively create a five-year "on-ramp" during which they could operate as NAFs regardless of their public float, extending the relief currently available only to emerging growth companies.[2][5]

The SEC is accepting public comments on the proposal through July 20, 2026. If adopted by the end of the year, the new framework could take effect in time for the 2027 proxy season, leaving corporate boards to decide whether to embrace the scaled-back disclosures or voluntarily maintain their current reporting practices to preserve shareholder goodwill.[3][6]

Viewpoints in depth

Regulatory & Capital Formation Advocates

Proponents argue that reducing disclosure burdens is essential to keeping U.S. public markets competitive.

Legal advisors and corporate issuers argue that the current executive compensation disclosure regime has become overly complex, costly, and detached from the needs of average investors. By eliminating the lengthy Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) and mandatory say-on-pay votes for smaller companies, the SEC lowers the barrier to entry for initial public offerings. Advocates emphasize that a five-year 'on-ramp' for newly public companies will encourage more private firms to list in the U.S., reversing a decades-long trend of companies staying private longer to avoid onerous compliance costs.

Institutional Investors

Governance watchdogs warn that the loss of standardized pay data will hinder their ability to evaluate corporate leadership.

Institutional investors and proxy advisory firms rely heavily on the detailed metrics provided in CD&As, CEO pay ratios, and pay-versus-performance tables to build their voting models. Without a dedicated say-on-pay ballot item, these stakeholders argue they lose a critical, non-binding mechanism to signal dissatisfaction with executive payouts. Some governance experts warn that if investors are forced to express their frustration by voting against the reelection of compensation committee members, it could lead to increased boardroom volatility and unintended disruptions for mid-sized companies.

Corporate Compensation Committees

Boards face a strategic dilemma over whether to adopt the scaled-back rules or voluntarily maintain current disclosures.

For the 81% of companies eligible for the new exemptions, the regulatory relief presents a complex choice. Compensation consultants note that while the SEC may no longer require a say-on-pay vote or a CD&A, major institutional shareholders may still demand them. Boards must weigh the cost savings of reduced compliance against the risk of alienating key investors. Many committees are currently evaluating whether to strip their proxy statements down to the regulatory minimum or voluntarily retain elements of the current regime to maintain transparency and shareholder goodwill.

Sources

Source coverage

7 outlets

3 viewpoints surfaced

Regulatory & Capital Formation Advocates 40%Institutional Investors 30%Corporate Compensation Committees 30%
  1. [1]Willis Towers WatsonCorporate Compensation Committees

    SEC proposal would reduce executive pay disclosures at many public companies

    Read on Willis Towers Watson
  2. [2]CooleyRegulatory & Capital Formation Advocates

    SEC Proposes Sea Change in Compensation Disclosure Rules for All but Largest Issuers

    Read on Cooley
  3. [3]Morrison FoersterRegulatory & Capital Formation Advocates

    SEC Proposal Would Sharply Scale Back Executive Compensation Disclosure for Most Public Companies

    Read on Morrison Foerster
  4. [4]Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate GovernanceInstitutional Investors

    SEC Proposal Would Sharply Scale Back Executive Compensation Disclosure

    Read on Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
  5. [5]Davis PolkCorporate Compensation Committees

    SEC proposes to ease compensation disclosure and say-on-pay for most public companies

    Read on Davis Polk
  6. [6]Latham & WatkinsRegulatory & Capital Formation Advocates

    SEC Proposes Sweeping Changes to Public Company Reporting Framework

    Read on Latham & Watkins
  7. [7]Troutman PepperCorporate Compensation Committees

    SEC Proposes Simplifying Executive Compensation Disclosure

    Read on Troutman Pepper

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