Probe Finds Chinese Telecoms Retained Footholds in US Critical Infrastructure Despite Crackdowns

For American businesses and consumers relying on secure domestic internet traffic, the assumption has long been that federal bans effectively removed Chinese state-owned telecommunications companies from U.S. infrastructure. A new bipartisan congressional investigation, however, reveals that this regulatory firewall was largely administrative, leaving physical hardware and network connections deeply embedded within the U.S. internet ecosystem.[1][6]

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party released a 49-page report detailing how China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom retained significant footholds in American data centers. Titled "Stranger Pings," the investigation found that despite having their operating authorities revoked by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) between 2019 and 2022, the companies maintained installed routers, server racks, power adapters, and cross-connecting equipment inside U.S. facilities.[2][4][6]

The investigation exposes a critical gap in federal enforcement mechanisms. While the FCC's revocation of Section 214 licenses successfully barred the firms from providing specific commercial telecommunications services, the agency lacked the statutory authority to mandate the physical extraction of existing hardware or the termination of private network leasing agreements.[1][4]

Consequently, the banned carriers pivoted toward less-regulated private networks, continuing to offer enterprise networking and internet transit services. By renting physical space within secure U.S. data centers, these companies preserved direct access to core network infrastructure, allowing them to route data between the United States, China, and Hong Kong.[1][2]

This persistent physical presence presents tangible security vulnerabilities. The committee's analysis of internet routing data found that China Mobile International's network appeared in routes to servers utilized by "Salt Typhoon"—a Chinese state-sponsored cyberespionage group—at least 192 times over a three-day period in late 2024.[1][3]

While investigators did not allege that telecom employees actively facilitated the Salt Typhoon campaign, the network overlap illustrates how residual infrastructure can inadvertently sustain malicious cyber operations. The retained connections provide potential vectors for foreign intelligence services to monitor sensitive traffic, hijack Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routes, and maintain dormant access to U.S. systems. The report identified over 108,000 incidents of alleged BGP hijacks involving Chinese or Hong Kong-linked networks between 2018 and 2025.[2][3][5]

Furthermore, the investigation highlighted that the U.S. subsidiaries of these telecom giants are not genuinely independent from their parent companies in mainland China and Hong Kong. This lack of independence raises concerns that the companies could be compelled to assist in state intelligence work under China's 2017 National Intelligence Law.[1][4][6]

Addressing this vulnerability requires a shift from administrative licensing bans to physical infrastructure audits. The committee is recommending that Congress grant federal agencies expanded statutory authority to identify, constrain, and physically remove foreign state-controlled network equipment from domestic data centers, closing the loophole that allowed these firms to operate in the shadows of the U.S. communications backbone.[3][6]