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ExplainerCivic TechnologyParticipatory Budgeting· 5 min read· in Community

Virtual Balances Prevent Slim Majorities From Monopolizing Participatory Budgeting

A new proportional voting algorithm called the Method of Equal Shares is replacing traditional winner-take-all systems in municipal elections. By assigning individualized spending limits, the software ensures that public funds are distributed according to the exact demographic weight of voter coalitions.

By Juliette Monroe

In short

  1. Traditional participatory budgeting uses a winner-take-all system, allowing a 51% majority to capture 100% of the available public funds.
  2. The Method of Equal Shares assigns every voter an equal virtual balance, mathematically capping any coalition's spending power at its demographic weight.
  3. When a project wins, its cost is deducted only from the virtual balances of its supporters, preserving minority funds for their own priorities.

Virtual balances work by dividing a city's total participatory budget equally among all voters, ensuring a 51% majority can only spend 51% of the funds. This mathematical constraint leaves the remaining 49% of the budget strictly reserved for the priorities of minority voters.[1][3]

Most municipalities use a "greedy" or knapsack voting method for their participatory budgets, simply funding the projects that receive the most overall votes until the money runs out. While this sounds democratic, it mathematically allows a slim, coordinated majority to sweep the board.[3]

"During the process of voting one can imagine a situation where 51 percent of the voters choose only all 'blue' projects and 49 percent only the 'green' ones," explains Piotr Skowron from the University of Warsaw.

"Through the standard voting method, the resources in the participatory budget would be allocated to the 'blue' projects," Skowron notes. The 49% minority goes home empty-handed, effectively wasting their votes and discouraging future civic participation.

Virtual balances cap the spending power of any single voting bloc at its exact demographic weight.

How Virtual Balances Change the Math

The Method of Equal Shares, developed by researchers including Skowron and Dominik Peters, replaces this winner-take-all system with proportional representation. Instead of treating the budget as a single communal pot, the algorithm assigns every voter an equal virtual share.[1][2]

If a city allocates $1 million and 10,000 residents vote, each voter receives a virtual balance of $100. This money cannot be traded or cashed out; it exists solely as a mathematical constraint within the voting software to cap individual influence.[1]

Voters still cast their ballots exactly as they always have, selecting the projects they want to see funded. The change happens entirely on the backend, where the algorithm uses these virtual balances to determine which projects actually get built.[1][4]

The system begins by identifying the most popular project overall. However, instead of simply paying for it out of the general fund, the algorithm divides the project's cost equally among the specific voters who supported it.[3][4]

The Cost-Sharing Mechanism

When a project is selected, its cost is deducted directly from the virtual balances of its backers. If a $50,000 playground is approved by 1,000 voters, each supporter pays exactly $50 from their virtual account to fund the construction.[3][4]

Crucially, voters who did not support the playground pay nothing. Their virtual balances remain untouched, preserving their full voting power for the projects they actually care about, such as library renovations or bike lanes.[1][3]

Simulations on real-world voting data demonstrate that proportional algorithms increase the number of voters who see their projects funded.

The algorithm then moves to the next most popular project and repeats the process. As the majority bloc continues to win projects, their virtual balances steadily deplete until they can no longer afford to fund anything else.[3]

Once the 51% majority exhausts their 51% share of the budget, they are mathematically locked out of the remaining funds. The algorithm bypasses their remaining preferences and begins funding the top choices of the 49% minority.[3]

Guaranteeing Proportional Representation

This mechanism ensures what computer scientists call "extended justified representation." In practical terms, it means that any cohesive group comprising exactly 10% of the electorate is mathematically guaranteed to control exactly 10% of the total budget.[3]

By capping the spending power of any single coalition, virtual balances prevent popular project categories from monopolizing the ballot. A highly organized neighborhood cannot drain the citywide budget at the expense of less coordinated districts.[1][3]

The system also naturally handles overlapping preferences. If a voter supports both a universally popular transit project and a niche community garden, their virtual balance will contribute to both, provided they have enough funds remaining.[1][4]

If a voter cannot afford their equal share of a project's cost because their balance is too low, they contribute whatever they have left. The remaining cost is then divided among the project's other supporters who still hold sufficient funds.[3][4]

When a project wins, its cost is divided equally and deducted only from the virtual balances of the voters who supported it.

Real-World Implementation and Results

The Method of Equal Shares is not just a theoretical exercise; it is actively reshaping civic technology. Cities like Aarau in Switzerland and Wieliczka in Poland have already implemented the algorithm for their participatory budgeting elections.

In these municipalities, the transition required no changes to the voter experience. Residents simply checked boxes on a digital ballot, while the open-source algorithm handled the complex cost-sharing calculations behind the scenes.[1]

Data from these real-world deployments shows a marked increase in overall voter satisfaction. Because the budget is distributed proportionally, a significantly larger fraction of the electorate sees at least one of their chosen projects fully funded.[1]

Researchers analyzing past voting data from Warsaw found that applying virtual balances would have systematically reduced the bias toward dominant project types. Road infrastructure would receive less disproportionate funding, elevating underrepresented categories like education and green spaces.[1]

Illustration: For the voter, the experience remains identical to traditional elections; the complex cost-sharing calculations happen entirely on the backend.

The Future of Civic Technology

As participatory budgeting grows globally, the demand for fairer aggregation rules is accelerating rapidly. The traditional greedy algorithm is increasingly viewed as a legacy system that fails to capture the nuance of diverse, modern urban populations.[2]

Virtual balances offer a scalable, mathematically rigorous alternative that builds trust in democratic institutions. When citizens know their votes directly control a specific fraction of the budget, they are more likely to engage with the process.[1][2]

The European Research Council recently awarded a prestigious grant to Piotr Skowron's team to further develop these proportional algorithms. This funding signals strong institutional support for upgrading democratic decision-making tools across the continent and beyond.

By simply changing how votes are counted on the backend, cities can transform a majoritarian popularity contest into a genuinely collaborative budgeting process. The algorithm ensures that every demographic weight translates directly into purchasing power, leaving no voter empty-handed.[5]

How we did this

Method
Comparison of budget allocation outcomes under majoritarian versus proportional rules based on a theoretical 51/49 voter split.
What we found
By shifting from a pool-based greedy selection to individualized virtual balances, the voting mechanism mathematically caps any coalition's spending power at its exact demographic weight, preventing a 51% voting bloc from capturing the 49% of the budget that would otherwise be denied to minority voters.
What we worked from
  • Standard greedy allocation to a 51% majority block: 100% of available funds — Wikipedia
  • Virtual balance allocation to the same 51% majority block: 51% of available funds — Wikipedia
Limits of this analysis
This theoretical comparison assumes a perfectly polarized electorate where the 51% and 49% blocs have zero overlapping project preferences.

Key terms

Participatory Budgeting
A democratic process in which community members directly decide how to spend part of a public budget.
Greedy Algorithm
A standard voting rule that simply funds the projects with the highest vote counts until the budget is exhausted.
Method of Equal Shares
A proportional voting algorithm that assigns each voter a virtual budget share to prevent majorities from monopolizing funds.
Extended Justified Representation
A mathematical guarantee that any cohesive group of voters will control a share of the budget proportional to their size.

Frequently asked

Do voters need to calculate their own virtual balances?

No. Voters simply select the projects they want to support on their ballot. The voting software automatically calculates the virtual balances and cost-sharing distributions on the backend after the polls close.

What happens if a voter's virtual balance is not fully spent?

If a voter's chosen projects do not receive enough total support to be funded, their virtual balance remains unspent. Most implementations use a completion method at the end of the process to fund smaller projects with any leftover budget.

Can a voter choose to give all their virtual money to one project?

No. The algorithm divides the cost of a winning project equally among all its supporters. A voter cannot voluntarily overpay to push a specific project over the finish line; their contribution is strictly capped by the equal-share formula.

Viewpoints in depth

Proportional Representation Advocates

Argue that public funds should be distributed according to the exact demographic weight of voter coalitions.

This camp, led by computational social choice researchers, contends that the standard greedy algorithm actively harms democratic engagement by repeatedly disenfranchising minorities. They argue that virtual balances mathematically guarantee fairness, ensuring that a 10% voting bloc receives exactly 10% of the budget. Their primary evidence is the "extended justified representation" axiom, which proves that no cohesive group can be systematically ignored under the Method of Equal Shares.

Majoritarian Traditionalists

Favor the simplicity and intuitive appeal of funding the projects that receive the highest absolute number of votes.

Defenders of the traditional knapsack algorithm argue that democracy is fundamentally about majority rule, and that the most popular projects deserve funding regardless of who voted for them. They express concern that proportional algorithms are too complex for the average citizen to understand, potentially reducing trust in the outcome. From this perspective, dividing costs through virtual balances feels like an opaque backend manipulation rather than a transparent tally of community preferences.

Civic Administrators

Focus on the practical implementation, software integration, and overall voter satisfaction metrics.

City officials and platform developers evaluate voting rules based on their operational friction and public reception. They note that while the Method of Equal Shares requires complex backend calculations, the frontend voter experience remains identical to traditional approval voting. Administrators point to pilot programs in Switzerland and Poland as evidence that the algorithm successfully increases the number of voters who see at least one of their chosen projects funded, thereby boosting overall satisfaction with the participatory budgeting process.

Proportional Representation Advocates 45%Majoritarian Traditionalists 30%Civic Administrators 25%
Proportional Representation Advocates
Argue that public funds should be distributed according to the exact demographic weight of voter coalitions.
Majoritarian Traditionalists
Favor the simplicity and intuitive appeal of funding the projects that receive the highest absolute number of votes.
Civic Administrators
Focus on the practical implementation, software integration, and overall voter satisfaction metrics.

Perspectives this story doesn't cover

  • Voters who prefer traditional majoritarian systems
  • Local politicians who rely on block-voting to secure neighborhood funding

Sources

Source coverage

5 outlets

3 viewpoints surfaced

Proportional Representation Advocates 45%Majoritarian Traditionalists 30%Civic Administrators 25%
  1. [1]EqualShares.netProportional Representation Advocates

    Method of Equal Shares for Participatory Budgeting

    Read on EqualShares.net →
  2. [2]arXivProportional Representation Advocates

    Designing Digital Voting Systems for Citizens: Achieving Fairness and Legitimacy in Participatory Budgeting

    Read on arXiv →
  3. [3]WikipediaMajoritarian Traditionalists

    Method of equal shares

    Read on Wikipedia →
  4. [4]ElectowikiCivic Administrators

    Method of Equal Shares

    Read on Electowiki →
  5. [5]Factlen Editorial TeamCivic Administrators

    Synthesis by Factlen editorial team

    Read on Factlen Editorial Team →

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