McKinsey Data: Electronics and Machinery Face Strongest Pressure for Manufacturing Footprint Shift
A new analysis of global supply chains reveals that while electronics and machinery final assembly is rapidly migrating to Southeast Asia, the underlying reliance on intermediate components remains deeply entrenched.
By Ishani Patel
In short
- McKinsey data identifies electronics, machinery, and semiconductors as the sectors facing the highest pressure to shift their manufacturing footprints.
- Final assembly is rapidly migrating to ASEAN and India, with ASEAN's share of US-bound electronics exports doubling to 20%.
- China is adapting by becoming a 'factory to the factories,' supplying the intermediate components to these new manufacturing hubs.
For consumers and businesses buying everything from smartphones to industrial tractors, the price tag increasingly reflects a hidden premium: the cost of moving the factory. As geopolitical tensions, tariffs, and industrial policies rewrite the rules of global trade, the companies building the world's hardware are being forced to uproot decades-old supply chains.
The map of where goods are assembled is changing rapidly, driven by a mandate to build resilience against future shocks. But while the final assembly locations are shifting across borders, the underlying dependency on the original suppliers is proving far harder to break.[3][4]
The pressure to relocate is not distributed evenly across the economy. According to a January 2026 analysis by McKinsey & Company, the electronics, machinery, and semiconductor sectors face the highest near-term disruption risk of any industry.
These sectors share a specific set of vulnerabilities. They are highly concentrated in a few geographic hubs, heavily capital-intensive, and deeply exposed to shifting trade rules and tariffs. Moving production for a semiconductor fabrication plant or a precision machinery facility requires billions of dollars in upfront investment, making footprint decisions expensive and difficult to reverse.[1]
How this disruption actually works comes down to the mechanics of modern manufacturing. In the electronics and machinery sectors, production relies on a vast web of specialized tier-two and tier-three suppliers providing intermediate components like printed circuit boards, microprocessors, and precision-machined parts.[3]
Moving final assembly—the last step where parts are put together—is relatively straightforward. Moving the entire ecosystem of component suppliers is a generational challenge. As a result, companies are finding that they can shift their final footprint, but they cannot easily replace the deep-tier suppliers that feed it.[2]
The evidence of this partial migration is visible in the latest global trade data. The McKinsey Global Institute's March 2026 update reveals that while direct US imports of consumer electronics from China have declined, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India have rapidly gained market share.
Between 2017 and 2024, the share of ASEAN's electronics exports headed to the United States doubled, rising from 10 percent to nearly 20 percent. This shift represents a massive reallocation of final assembly capacity to emerging markets.
However, cross-referencing the disruption risk with the trade flow data reveals a structural catch. While final assembly has shifted to ASEAN countries to avoid direct geopolitical exposure and tariffs, China has deepened its role as a supplier of intermediate inputs to those exact same ASEAN hubs.[3]
China is increasingly acting as a "factory to the factories," shipping the essential chips, smartphone parts, and industrial components needed to power the new advanced manufacturing centers in Southeast Asia. The geographic distance of trade has increased, but the geopolitical dependency remains embedded in the sub-components.[4]
Where the evidence remains thin is the long-term cost impact of this two-step supply chain. While surveys indicate that 97 percent of supply chain leaders have applied combinations of inventory increases, dual sourcing, and regionalization to boost resilience, the financial toll of these buffers is still emerging.[2]
Some models suggest that up to 20 percent of production costs could increase due to supply chain disruptions and the inefficiencies of fragmented production networks. It is currently unclear how much of that premium will be absorbed by manufacturers' margins versus passed on to end consumers in the form of higher prices.[3]
Furthermore, the data highlights a critical blind spot in corporate risk management. The majority of companies report understanding their supply chain risks only up to their tier-one suppliers—the companies that sell directly to them.[2]
This lack of deep-tier visibility leaves them largely blind to deeper vulnerabilities. A disruption at a tier-three component manufacturer in Asia could still halt production at a newly reshored facility in the United States or Europe, entirely negating the resilience benefits of the new footprint.[2][4]
For the electronics and machinery sectors, the next phase of the footprint shift will require moving beyond geographic relocation. True resilience will depend on whether companies can successfully map their entire multi-tier supply networks and incentivize the migration of the deeper component ecosystems. Until then, the global manufacturing map will continue to look different on the surface, while remaining deeply interconnected underneath.[3]
How we did this
- Method
- Cross-referencing McKinsey's January 2026 disruption risk tiering with their March 2026 global trade flow data to map the execution gap in supply chain reconfiguration.
- What we found
- While high-risk sectors like electronics are successfully shifting final assembly to ASEAN to avoid direct geopolitical exposure, the underlying dependency remains intact as China pivots to supplying those new ASEAN hubs with intermediate components—meaning the cost penalty of relocation buys geographic distance but not true supply chain decoupling.
- What we worked from
- Electronics and machinery disruption risk tier: Highest near-term pressure for change
- ASEAN electronics exports to the US: Doubled from 10% to nearly 20%
- Limits of this analysis
- The analysis relies on aggregate trade flow data, which cannot track the exact origin of every sub-component within a specific manufacturer's supply chain.
Jargon, explained
- Tier-one supplier
- A company that provides parts or materials directly to the final manufacturer of a product.
- Tier-two supplier
- A company that supplies components or raw materials to a tier-one supplier, sitting one step further back in the supply chain.
- Nearshoring
- The practice of transferring a business operation to a nearby country, often to reduce distance and geopolitical risk.
- Intermediate goods
- Components and parts that are used as inputs in the production of finished goods, such as microchips or bare circuit boards.
Competing readings
Supply Chain Resilience Advocates
Argue that geographic diversification and multi-tier visibility are essential survival tactics despite the high upfront costs.
This camp, heavily represented by operations consultants and enterprise risk managers, views the current supply chain volatility not as a temporary anomaly, but as a permanent structural shift. They argue that the capital expense of relocating factories and holding larger inventory buffers is the necessary price of admission for operating in a multipolar world. For these advocates, the primary failure mode is not the high cost of moving, but the lack of visibility into tier-two and tier-three suppliers, which leaves newly relocated plants just as vulnerable to upstream shocks as the legacy networks they replaced.
Global Trade Realists
Emphasize that true decoupling is a myth, as intermediate component dependencies simply reroute through third-party nations.
Macroeconomic analysts and trade economists point to the data showing that while direct bilateral trade between rival superpowers may decrease, the underlying economic dependencies remain largely intact. They highlight the 'factory to the factories' phenomenon, where intermediate goods flow from legacy hubs to new assembly centers in Southeast Asia or Latin America. From this perspective, the current manufacturing footprint shift is less about achieving true self-sufficiency and more about inserting geographic buffers into the supply chain to comply with tariffs and geopolitical optics, often at the expense of efficiency.
Cost-Focused Manufacturers
Concerned with the capital expense of relocation and the margin pressure of operating fragmented, multi-step supply chains.
For the executives actually operating the factories, the footprint shift presents a severe margin squeeze. Moving production requires billions in upfront capital expenditure, while operating a more fragmented, regionalized network sacrifices the economies of scale built up over the past three decades. This camp warns that the estimated 20 percent cost premium of supply chain reconfiguration cannot be entirely absorbed by corporate balance sheets, meaning the ultimate cost of geopolitical resilience will inevitably be passed down to end consumers in the form of higher prices for electronics and machinery.
- Global Trade Realists
- Emphasize that true decoupling is a myth, as intermediate component dependencies simply reroute through third-party nations.
- Supply Chain Resilience Advocates
- Argue that geographic diversification and multi-tier visibility are essential survival tactics despite the high upfront costs.
- Corporate Risk Managers
- Focus on the execution gap, noting that companies remain blind to deep-tier vulnerabilities and are pausing digital investments.
Perspectives this story doesn't cover
- End consumers facing potential price increases
- Tier-three component suppliers in legacy manufacturing hubs
Sources
[1]Supply Chain 24/7Supply Chain Resilience AdvocatesHigh disruption industries: Electronics, machinery, semiconductors
Read on Supply Chain 24/7 →
[2]Libertify ResearchCorporate Risk ManagersMcKinsey: How Global Supply Chain Disruption Is Reshaping Manufacturing
Read on Libertify Research →
[3]The Bretton Woods CommitteeGlobal Trade RealistsGeopolitics and the Geometry of Global Trade, 2026 Update
Read on The Bretton Woods Committee →
[4]Factlen Editorial TeamGlobal Trade RealistsSynthesis by Factlen editorial team
Read on Factlen Editorial Team →
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