DOJ Antitrust Division Withdraws Decades-Old Letter Shielding Proxy Advisor ISS
The Department of Justice has revoked a 1987 Business Review Letter that provided antitrust comfort to Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), citing the firm's expansion into corporate consulting and extreme market concentration. The move signals heightened federal scrutiny over the proxy advisory industry and its influence on corporate governance.
- Antitrust Enforcers
- Argues that the extreme market concentration of proxy advisors requires active DOJ oversight to prevent unchecked influence over corporate governance.
- Institutional Investors
- Values the efficiency and independent research provided by proxy advisors to manage the logistical burden of voting across thousands of portfolio companies.
- Corporate Management
- Views the unchecked power of proxy advisors as a threat to board autonomy, particularly when advisors push uniform ESG mandates.
At a glance
- The DOJ Antitrust Division withdrew a 1987 Business Review Letter that had shielded proxy advisor ISS from antitrust enforcement.
- Enforcers cited ISS's expansion into corporate consulting, which conflicts with the original letter's stipulations.
- The DOJ also highlighted that ISS and Glass Lewis control over 90 percent of the proxy advisory market.
- The withdrawal follows a December 2025 Executive Order directing antitrust agencies to investigate proxy advisors.
- At least 13 states have recently proposed or enacted legislation imposing new regulations on proxy advisory firms.
On August 5, 2026, the Department of Justice formally revoked a 39-year-old document that had shielded the world's largest proxy advisory firm from antitrust scrutiny. The withdrawal of the 1987 Business Review Letter issued to Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) marks a structural shift in how the federal government treats the mechanics of corporate governance.[1][2]
The DOJ Antitrust Division stated that the original letter no longer reflects ISS's current business practices or the competitive realities of the modern financial ecosystem. When the letter was issued, proxy advising was in its infancy, and the DOJ granted antitrust comfort based on the explicit understanding that ISS would strictly advise on voting rights without engaging in corporate consulting.[1][6]
Today, the landscape is fundamentally different. Enforcers argue that ISS has expanded its operations well beyond that initial limited scope, offering corporate consulting services that directly conflict with the foundational premise of the 1987 safe harbor.[1][8]
Beyond the shift in business models, the DOJ pointed to extreme market concentration as a primary driver for the withdrawal. ISS and its main competitor, Glass, Lewis & Co., now control more than 90 percent of the proxy advisory market in the United States.[4][5]
Because their institutional investor clients hold significant ownership stakes in virtually every major publicly traded company, this duopoly wields tremendous influence over corporate governance matters. The DOJ noted that this market dominance allows the two firms to effectively shape the policies of America's largest corporations.[1][9]
The DOJ noted that this market dominance allows the two firms to effectively shape the policies of America's largest corporations.
The withdrawal does not constitute a formal enforcement action or a finding that ISS has violated antitrust laws. However, legal analysts note that a Business Review Letter only states the DOJ's enforcement intentions at the time of issuance, leaving the agency completely free to bring future actions if it deems them necessary for the public interest.[5][6]
The timing of the revocation aligns with a broader political and regulatory campaign against proxy advisors. In December 2025, the Trump administration issued an Executive Order directing antitrust agencies to investigate proxy advisors for unfair methods of competition, specifically targeting their support for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives and diversity programs.[2][4]
Congressional Republicans have also pressured the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission to rein in the influence of these firms, applauding recent investigations and encouraging further legal action to curb what they view as ideological overreach.[3]
At the state level, the pressure has been equally intense. At least 13 states have recently proposed or enacted legislation imposing strict disclosure requirements and other operational obligations on proxy advisory firms, while the Florida Attorney General launched a separate antitrust lawsuit in late 2025.[9]
For institutional investors—such as pension funds, mutual funds, and asset managers—proxy advisors solve a massive collective action problem. Fiduciaries responsible for managing vast pools of capital often lack the internal resources to analyze and vote on thousands of director elections, executive compensation packages, and shareholder proposals every proxy season.[2][7]
Stripping ISS of its antitrust comfort introduces new legal risks for the asset management industry. If proxy advisors are forced to alter their uniform voting recommendations or curtail their research output to avoid hub-and-spoke conspiracy allegations, institutional investors may face significantly higher compliance costs.[2][8]
Ultimately, the DOJ's maneuver signals that the federal government is no longer willing to treat proxy advisors as neutral administrative utilities. As the next proxy season approaches, the industry faces the dual threat of heightened federal antitrust scrutiny and an increasingly hostile state-level legislative environment.[5][9]
Different angles
The 1987 Safe Harbor Paradigm (Unrestricted Advisory)
Allowing proxy advisors to operate with minimal antitrust friction to solve the collective action problem of institutional voting.
For: This model efficiently solves a massive logistical burden. Institutional investors hold stakes in thousands of companies and lack the internal resources to analyze every board election or executive compensation package. Against: It centralizes immense power in unaccountable third parties, allowing a duopoly to dictate corporate policy without bearing the economic risk of those decisions. Evidence: ISS and Glass Lewis control over 90 percent of the proxy advisory market, guiding trillions of dollars in shareholder votes. Fits well when: The advisory firms stick strictly to providing data and neutral voting mechanics. Does not fit when: The firms expand into corporate consulting, creating potential conflicts of interest by advising the same companies they evaluate.
The 2026 Antitrust Scrutiny Paradigm (Active Enforcement)
Applying aggressive antitrust oversight to proxy advisors to curb market concentration and ideological influence.
For: Active enforcement prevents a highly concentrated duopoly from acting as a de facto regulatory body over American corporations, particularly regarding ESG and DEI initiatives. Against: Stripping antitrust comfort may chill the provision of independent governance research, forcing institutional investors to either rubber-stamp management proposals or spend millions replicating analysis. Evidence: The DOJ explicitly cited ISS's expansion into corporate consulting and its 90 percent combined market share with Glass Lewis as grounds for withdrawing the 1987 letter, alongside 13 states passing or proposing new regulations. Fits well when: Proxy advisors leverage their market dominance to force uniform corporate behaviors that conflict with the financial priorities of end investors. Does not fit when: The scrutiny is used purely as a political tool to punish firms for offering research on environmental and social risks that clients actively demand.
Sources
[1]Department of JusticeAntitrust EnforcersJustice Department Withdraws 1987 Business Review Letter Issued to ISS
Read on Department of Justice →
[2]Paul, WeissAntitrust EnforcersDOJ Withdraws 1987 Business Review Letter Issued to ISS, Potentially Indicating Antitrust Scrutiny over Proxy Advisors
Read on Paul, Weiss →
[3]Practical ESGAntitrust EnforcersDOJ Withdraws 1987 Business Review Letter Issued to ISS
Read on Practical ESG →
[4]CooleyInstitutional InvestorsDOJ Withdraws 1987 ISS Antitrust Letter
Read on Cooley →
[5]Morrison FoersterInstitutional InvestorsDOJ Withdraws 1987 ISS Business Review Letter, Thereby Signaling Continued Proxy-Advisor Scrutiny
Read on Morrison Foerster →
[6]VitalLawCorporate ManagementJustice Department withdraws 40-year-old business review letter for proxy advisory firm
Read on VitalLaw →
[7]PYMNTSInstitutional InvestorsDOJ Withdraws Antitrust Guidance Letter for Proxy Advisory Firm ISS
Read on PYMNTS →
[8]Jones DayInstitutional InvestorsDOJ Withdraws 1987 Business Review Letter Issued to ISS
Read on Jones Day →
[9]Harvard Law School ForumCorporate ManagementDOJ Withdraws 1987 Business Review Letter Issued to ISS
Read on Harvard Law School Forum →
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