Unplanned Power Plant Outages Fall Sharply During 2026 Winter Storms, FERC-NERC Report Shows

Staff at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation reported on September 10 that peak power plant outages across the Eastern Interconnection reached 49,700 megawatts during January 2026 cold weather.[1][2]

That figure represents a sharp drop from the 90,500 megawatts of capacity lost during Winter Storm Elliott in December 2022. In Texas, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas saw outages peak near 19,420 megawatts, compared to the catastrophic 35,300 megawatts lost during Winter Storm Uri in February 2021. Neither region was forced to shed firm load—meaning no rolling blackouts were ordered—even as United States electric use peaked at 666 gigawatts.[1][4]

The joint report credits the improved performance to the implementation of cold weather reliability standards, advanced generator commitments, and better coordination between natural gas pipelines and electric grid operators. "The progress we've made demonstrates that careful analysis and action can protect critical infrastructure during the most challenging conditions," FERC Chairman Laura V. Swett said following the report's release.[2]

However, the comparison flatters the result. Both Elliott and Uri represent the two worst generator failures of the modern American winter. Measuring the 49,700 megawatts and 19,420 megawatts of lost capacity against those events shows improvement from a catastrophic baseline, not proof that the fleet can now hold under a worst-case scenario. Winter Storms Fern and Gianna never pushed either region to firm load shed, meaning the 2026 system was never tested at the severity that produced those older numbers.[1]

The report also heavily credits interregional power transfers, which act as a dependency rather than a physical hardening of the grid. The Midcontinent Independent System Operator imported about 9 gigawatts, mostly from the PJM Interconnection, while Florida exported power during Fern and imported during Gianna. Both cases worked because the neighboring region had a surplus at the exact hour of need. A storm that puts PJM and MISO under peak stress simultaneously would remove the resource the report names as decisive.[1]

During the storms, the Department of Energy issued 15 emergency orders under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, authorizing grid operators to deploy backup generation at data centers and other major facilities. The DOE estimated that more than 35 gigawatts of unused backup generation was available nationwide to mitigate blackouts.[1][3]

Yet, an authority that goes unused proves nothing about whether it works in practice. ERCOT reported that it never called for conservation, never issued an Energy Emergency Alert, and saw no systemwide outages during Fern. Robert Clark, an engineer in FERC’s Office of Electric Reliability, confirmed that no one called on backup generation at data centers during the 2026 storms. The orders therefore stand untested in the field.[1][4]

The reliance on emergency orders is also facing legal headwinds. On September 11, a federal appeals court vacated a separate DOE emergency order that had forced a Michigan coal plant to keep running, ruling that the department acted outside its statutory authority. The court's decision limits the administration's ability to unilaterally intervene in energy markets to prevent power plant retirements, casting doubt on how broadly the DOE can wield its emergency powers during future grid crises.[5]

While the electric and natural gas systems survived the multi-day stress, FERC and NERC staff flagged ongoing gaps in load forecasting and infrastructure. Electric and gas entities agree that more gas storage and pipeline transportation capacity would improve reliability during Arctic cold, leaving the question of whether the grid is truly winterized or simply got lucky with the weather pattern.[1][2]