Ethiopia Accused of Training Sudan's RSF as Regional Tensions With Eritrea and UAE/Saudi Rivalry Escalate

A massive, well-fortified military camp in western Ethiopia has emerged as a covert training ground for thousands of fighters linked to Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Located in the remote Benishangul-Gumuz region, roughly 32 kilometers from the Sudanese border, the facility represents the first direct evidence of Ethiopian involvement in Sudan's devastating civil war. The camp, carved out of forested land near the town of Asosa, is reportedly capable of housing up to 10,000 recruits.[1]

Diplomatic cables and internal security memos indicate that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) financed the camp's construction and provided military trainers. Satellite imagery reviewed by international monitors shows rapid development at the site, including the erection of hundreds of tents, the arrival of heavy logistics trucks, and new drone support infrastructure at the nearby Asosa airport.[1][3]

The revelation marks a dangerous escalation in a conflict that has already killed tens of thousands and displaced more than 11 million people. The RSF, commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has been locked in a brutal war of attrition against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since April 2023. Until now, external support for the paramilitaries had largely flowed through covert supply lines in Chad, Libya, and Uganda.[2]

By hosting a dedicated training facility, Ethiopia has effectively opened a new eastern front. Recruits at the Benishangul-Gumuz camp—which reportedly include Ethiopians, South Sudanese mercenaries, and Sudanese rebels—are expected to deploy directly into Sudan's Blue Nile state. This strategic positioning allows the RSF to pressure the SAF from a previously secure flank, compounding the military challenges facing the Sudanese government.[1][2]

The UAE has vehemently denied any involvement in the Sudanese conflict, stating it is not a party to the hostilities. Ethiopian authorities have similarly dismissed allegations of hosting RSF fighters, framing the reports as attempts to drive a wedge between Addis Ababa and Khartoum. However, UN panels, independent researchers, and multiple diplomatic sources have consistently documented Emirati logistical support for the RSF.[1]

The camp's existence is accelerating a broader geopolitical realignment across the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's deepening ties with the RSF and the UAE have alarmed neighboring states, particularly Egypt and Eritrea. Both nations have firmly aligned themselves with the SAF, viewing the UAE-Ethiopia axis as a direct threat to their own national security interests.[3][4]

For Egypt, the stakes are existential. Cairo regards Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam—located just across the border from Sudan's Blue Nile state—as a critical vulnerability. The prospect of UAE-backed RSF forces operating in the dam's vicinity has prompted Egypt to increase its military support for the Sudanese army and forge closer security ties with Somalia and Eritrea, effectively encircling Ethiopia.[3][4]

Eritrea, meanwhile, remains deeply suspicious of Ethiopian expansionism following the unresolved aftermath of the Tigray war. President Isaias Afwerki has cultivated a strong relationship with the SAF to secure Eritrea's western border and counter the UAE's growing footprint in the Red Sea region. This dynamic has transformed the Ethiopia-Eritrea border into a heavily militarized fault line.[3]

The polarization is drawing in competing Middle Eastern powers, turning the Horn of Africa into a proxy battleground. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are increasingly coordinating their diplomatic and military support for the SAF and Eritrea. This emerging bloc stands in direct opposition to the UAE's strategic investments in Ethiopia and its alleged backing of the RSF, mirroring broader Gulf rivalries.[4]

The consequences of this proxy competition are already spilling over into active combat. Recent reports indicate that clashes in western Tigray have involved RSF elements fighting alongside Ethiopian federal forces and local militias against regional insurgents. These cross-border entanglements demonstrate how quickly domestic political disputes are being absorbed into interstate rivalries.[4]

Humanitarian organizations warn that the internationalization of the conflict will prolong the suffering of civilians caught in the crossfire. The influx of foreign funding and advanced weaponry—including attack drones—has enabled both the SAF and the RSF to sustain high-intensity operations despite widespread famine and economic collapse.[2]

Regional analysts caution that without immediate diplomatic intervention, the interlocking crises in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia could ignite a wider transnational war. The convergence of the Nile water dispute, the Tigray aftermath, and the Sudanese civil war threatens to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa, posing severe risks to global maritime trade through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[3][4]