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ExplainerSubsea InfrastructureExplainer· 5 min read· in World

How 600 Undersea Cables Route the Global Internet Through Three Physical Chokepoints

While the transatlantic data corridor possesses massive failover redundancy, the Europe-Asia and intra-Asian networks rely on physical straits so narrow that a single maritime event can sever over 70 percent of a region's bandwidth.

By Svetlana Pavlova

Infrastructure Operators 40%Maritime Security Analysts 35%International Regulators 25%
Infrastructure Operators
Focus on the physical maintenance, repair logistics, and the necessity of route diversity to prevent catastrophic network failures.
Maritime Security Analysts
View the concentration of cables in narrow straits as a critical national security vulnerability susceptible to both state sabotage and accidental damage.
International Regulators
Emphasize the legal frameworks governing the high seas and the need for international cooperation to protect shared communication infrastructure.

Why it matters now

The physical infrastructure of the global internet is heavily concentrated in a few narrow maritime corridors. A single anchor drag or seismic event in the Red Sea or Luzon Strait can instantly disconnect entire continents from the global financial system.

At a depth of 3,000 meters in the Luzon Strait, where the Philippine Sea meets the South China Sea, a bundle of fiber-optic cables no thicker than a garden hose rests on the ocean floor. Inside these steel-armored tubes, light pulses carry the vast majority of digital communication between Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. From the surface, the strait appears as open water, but on the seabed, it is one of the most congested and critical infrastructure corridors on Earth.

It is a common misconception that global communication is accomplished primarily via satellite. In reality, over 99 percent of international data and voice transfers are routed through the physical fiber-optic cables that crisscross the world's seafloors. According to the Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. regulatory agency overseeing the infrastructure, these lines "provide the primary means of connectivity – voice, data and Internet – between the United States and the rest of the world," carrying a majority of civilian, military, and government offshore communications traffic. The total network spans over 1.5 million kilometers globally, connecting every continent except Antarctica.[2][3]

The physical construction of a modern submarine cable is remarkably delicate given the environment it inhabits. The core consists of glass optical fibers, roughly the diameter of a human hair, through which lasers fire data at extremely rapid rates using Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing. These fibers are encased in a copper or aluminum tube that carries high-voltage electricity to power the repeaters spaced along the route. This core is then wrapped in layers of polycarbonate, water barriers, stranded steel wires for armor, and an outer sheath of polyethylene.[2]

The physical layers of a modern submarine communications cable.

While the transatlantic route between North America and Europe possesses massive redundancy—with dozens of cables spread across a wide geographic expanse—other regions are structurally constrained by geography. The connection between Europe and Asia, for example, is almost entirely dependent on the Red Sea. Fifteen submarine cables pass through the narrow Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the southern mouth of the Red Sea that separates East Africa from the Arabian Peninsula. This creates a single point of failure for the data traffic of multiple continents.[4]

The vulnerability of these chokepoints is not theoretical. In early 2024, a vessel struck by a Houthi missile in the Red Sea dropped its anchor and drifted for two weeks before sinking. The dragging anchor severed three major cables, severely impacting internet connectivity across East Africa and South Asia. Repairing the damage took months, as cable repair ships require specialized equipment, secure conditions, and permits from multiple jurisdictions to operate in contested waters.[4]

The Red Sea and Luzon Strait act as severe physical bottlenecks for global data traffic compared to the transatlantic corridor.
In early 2024, a vessel struck by a Houthi missile in the Red Sea dropped its anchor and drifted for two weeks before sinking.

The Luzon Strait faces a different set of physical threats. Located in the Circum-Pacific Ring of Fire, the seabed is prone to intense seismic activity. In December 2006, the Hengchun earthquakes off the southern tip of Taiwan severed six of the seven cable systems in the corridor. International communication and digital activity in Taiwan and neighboring nations was instantly interrupted; banks could not process transactions, and airlines were forced to halt check-ins. The event demonstrated how quickly the cloud collapses when its physical foundation is fractured.[4]

The legal framework governing this infrastructure was drafted long before the internet existed. The United States and other nations rely on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), specifically Article 112, which guarantees the right of all states to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high seas beyond the continental shelf. However, UNCLOS provides little enforcement mechanism against accidental damage, which accounts for the vast majority of cable faults.[1]

Fishing trawlers and ship anchors cause over 70 percent of all cable faults globally. When a cable is severed, the repair process is entirely physical. A specialized cable-laying ship must navigate to the fault location, deploy a remotely operated vehicle or a grappling hook to retrieve the broken ends from the seabed, bring them to the surface, splice the microscopic glass fibers back together on the ship's deck, and lower the repaired section back into the ocean.[2]

Remotely operated vehicles are used to inspect and bury submarine cables in shallower waters to protect them from anchor damage.

The economics of the network are currently undergoing a structural shift. Historically, submarine cables were built by consortiums of state-owned telecommunications companies. Today, hyperscale cloud providers—specifically Meta, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon—are the dominant investors. Driven by the massive bandwidth requirements of their data centers, these four companies now own or lease the majority of new transoceanic capacity, shifting control of the internet's physical layer from national carriers to private technology firms.[4]

To mitigate the risks of the Red Sea and Luzon Strait chokepoints, these companies are attempting to diversify routes. New projects aim to bypass the South China Sea entirely by routing cables through the Celebes and Banda Seas, connecting Singapore directly to the United States via Guam. Other initiatives seek to connect Europe and Asia via terrestrial routes across the Arabian Peninsula or through the Arctic Ocean, though these face their own geopolitical and environmental hurdles.[4]

Despite these efforts, the fundamental reality of the global internet remains unchanged. It is not a decentralized, ethereal cloud, but a highly centralized, physical network of glass and steel resting on the ocean floor. As long as geography dictates the most efficient paths for these cables, the global economy will remain tethered to the stability of a few narrow, vulnerable straits.[4]

Different angles

Infrastructure Operators

The industry prioritizes route diversity and rapid repair capabilities to maintain the illusion of a seamless cloud.

For the companies that map, lay, and maintain the global cable network, the primary concern is physical redundancy. They operate on the assumption that cables will inevitably be cut—whether by a dragging anchor, a fishing trawler, or a submarine landslide. The goal is not to build an indestructible cable, which is physically impossible, but to ensure enough parallel routes exist so that traffic can instantly failover when a fault occurs. The severe lack of alternative routes around the Red Sea and the Luzon Strait is viewed as the industry's most pressing structural flaw, driving billions of dollars in new investment toward the Celebes Sea and terrestrial bypasses.

Maritime Security Analysts

Security experts view the physical concentration of the internet as a critical vulnerability in hybrid warfare.

From a national security perspective, the fact that 99 percent of intercontinental data relies on undefended cables resting on the seabed is a massive strategic liability. Analysts point to the Red Sea, where the Bab el-Mandeb Strait forces the data traffic of Europe, Africa, and Asia into a corridor just 26 kilometers wide. In this environment, the distinction between an accidental anchor drag and deliberate state-sponsored sabotage becomes nearly impossible to prove. The concentration of infrastructure transforms these narrow maritime corridors into high-value targets where a single asymmetric action can inflict disproportionate economic damage on rival nations.

International Regulators

Legal bodies rely on decades-old maritime treaties that offer little practical protection against modern threats.

The legal architecture protecting the global internet is based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a treaty negotiated before the fiber-optic era. While UNCLOS guarantees the right to lay cables and requires states to criminalize deliberate severing, it provides no international enforcement mechanism and offers little recourse for the accidental damage that causes the vast majority of outages. Regulators are increasingly caught between the necessity of protecting this infrastructure and the reality that the high seas remain largely unpoliced, leaving the physical safety of the internet dependent on the careful navigation of commercial shipping.

Sources

Source coverage

4 outlets

3 viewpoints surfaced

Infrastructure Operators 40%Maritime Security Analysts 35%International Regulators 25%
  1. [1]United NationsInternational Regulators

    UNCLOS Part VII: High Seas

    Read on United Nations
  2. [2]WikipediaMaritime Security Analysts

    Submarine communications cable

    Read on Wikipedia
  3. [3]Federal Communications CommissionInternational Regulators

    Submarine Cables

    Read on Federal Communications Commission
  4. [4]Factlen Editorial TeamInfrastructure Operators

    Synthesis by Factlen editorial team

    Read on Factlen Editorial Team

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