US and Saudi Arabia Sign Landmark Civil Nuclear Deal: How the Agreement Works

On July 22, 2026, United States Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed a landmark civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, concluding years of complex diplomatic negotiations. The pact establishes a formal legal foundation for the transfer of American nuclear technology, materials, and scientific expertise to the kingdom.[6]

Known formally as a "123 agreement," the pact establishes a 30-year framework that allows Saudi Arabia to develop a domestic civilian nuclear program with direct assistance from the United States. The signing marks a significant geopolitical pivot, ensuring that American firms, rather than competitors in Russia or China, will be the preferred partners in building out the Middle Eastern nation's atomic infrastructure.[8]

For the US nuclear industry, the agreement opens a highly lucrative new market. American companies like Westinghouse Electric Company are now poised to bid on massive infrastructure projects, with Saudi Arabia's first planned nuclear power plant estimated to cost roughly $14 billion. Industry executives have praised the deal as a vital driver for long-term economic growth and high-paying engineering jobs.[1][2]

Saudi Arabia's motivation is deeply tied to its "Vision 2030" economic initiative. The kingdom is aggressively seeking to diversify its energy grid away from fossil fuels. By deploying nuclear power to generate electricity for a growing population and to run energy-intensive water desalination plants, Riyadh aims to free up more of its domestic crude oil production for lucrative international export.[8]

The mechanism enabling this trade is named after Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954. These bilateral pacts are a strict legal prerequisite for any significant nuclear commerce between the United States and a foreign government. They require the receiving nation to adhere to rigorous peaceful-use mandates and physical-protection standards to prevent the diversion of civilian technology into weapons programs.[7]

However, the most closely scrutinized aspect of the US-Saudi deal is whether it ultimately permits domestic uranium enrichment. Enrichment is a dual-use technology: when uranium is enriched to low levels, it serves as standard fuel for commercial power reactors, but when enriched to highly concentrated levels, it can yield the fissile material required for a nuclear weapon.[4][5]

Unlike the 2009 US nuclear agreement with the United Arab Emirates—which included a legally binding "gold standard" commitment to entirely forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing—the Saudi pact reportedly does not explicitly ban the practice. Saudi officials have long maintained that they have a sovereign right to mine and enrich their own vast domestic uranium reserves.[2][7]

Instead of a blanket ban, the agreement reportedly stipulates that any future enrichment on Saudi soil would be strictly controlled and operated by US companies. Under this arrangement, the sensitive enrichment technology would remain in a "black box," operated by American personnel and not shared with Saudi scientists, theoretically allowing the kingdom to profit from its uranium without gaining the technical know-how to build a bomb.[2]

The day after the official signing, President Donald Trump introduced a layer of public uncertainty regarding the enrichment terms. In a social media post, the President stated that the deal would not allow the Saudis to enrich uranium at all, and further stipulated that the entire agreement is "totally subject" to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel.[1][2]

Beyond enrichment, another major point of contention among nonproliferation experts is the level of international oversight required by the pact. The agreement relies on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which Saudi Arabia has already signed and which mandates regular inspections of declared nuclear sites.[7]

Crucially, however, the pact reportedly does not require Riyadh to sign the IAEA's "Additional Protocol." The Additional Protocol is a more stringent voluntary agreement that grants international inspectors significantly broader authority, including the right to conduct short-notice "snap" inspections at undeclared or suspicious locations across the country.[3][8]

To compensate for the absence of the Additional Protocol, US negotiators developed alternative bilateral monitoring arrangements. According to officials, sensitive inspections and material tracking will be executed directly by American teams under specific terms spelled out in an accompanying bilateral safeguards agreement, ensuring US eyes remain on the ground.[2][6]

US energy and diplomatic officials argue that partnering with Saudi Arabia is a strategic necessity despite the nonproliferation compromises. If Washington refused to provide the requested nuclear technology, Riyadh had made it abundantly clear that it would turn to state-backed nuclear corporations in China or Russia—nations with significantly looser nonproliferation standards and no requirement for US oversight.[3][6]

The backdrop of the agreement is the ongoing geopolitical tension in the Middle East. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously stated in public interviews that if regional rival Iran successfully develops a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will immediately follow suit, a declaration that continues to heighten anxieties among global arms control advocates.[2][5]

With the executive branch signatures secured, the 123 agreement now moves to Capitol Hill for a mandatory review period. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the US Congress has 90 days of continuous session to review the details of the pact and debate its merits.[2][8]

Unlike a standard international treaty, which requires an affirmative two-thirds vote in the Senate to be ratified, a 123 agreement automatically goes into effect at the end of the 90-day period unless Congress actively intervenes. To stop the deal, lawmakers must pass a joint resolution of disapproval.[7][8]

Even if opponents in Congress muster the simple majorities needed to pass a resolution blocking the deal, the legislation would almost certainly face a presidential veto. Overriding that veto would require a formidable two-thirds supermajority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, a high bar for opponents to clear.[8]

As the 90-day congressional clock ticks down, the US nuclear industry is already moving forward. American firms are preparing feasibility studies for deploying advanced reactors in the kingdom, marking the initial steps of what is designed to be a multi-decade energy and security partnership between Washington and Riyadh.[3][8]