The Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess Sequence: How the Military Executes the Joint Targeting Cycle

To modern airpower advocates, the F2T2EA sequence is the ultimate triumph of precision—a streamlined kill chain that compresses the chaos of the battlefield into a predictable, single-digit-minute loop of finding and destroying a target. To its critics, however, this same six-step cycle is a rigid relic of the 1990s, an overly linear process that leaves forces vulnerable to adversaries who can adapt, spoof, or move faster than the chain can reset. The debate over how the military executes its joint targeting cycle is no longer just about speed; it is a fundamental disagreement over whether a sequential checklist can survive in an era of hypersonic weapons and multi-domain warfare.[2][4]

The foundation of this debate rests on a concept that fundamentally altered modern warfare. In October 1996, General Ronald R. Fogleman, then the Air Force Chief Staff, stood before an Air Force Association symposium and issued a sweeping declaration. "In the first quarter of the 21st century," Fogleman stated, "it will become possible to find, fix or track, and target anything that moves on the surface of the Earth." That vision catalyzed the development of what is now formally known as dynamic targeting, a process designed to prosecute targets that emerge too late to be included in a standard 24-hour Air Tasking Order.[1][3][4]

To achieve Fogleman's vision, the military codified the process into six distinct phases: Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess. Colloquially known as the "kill chain," this F2T2EA framework dictates that every engagement must follow a strict sequential order. If a target cannot be found, it cannot be fixed; if it cannot be tracked, it cannot be targeted. The chain is entirely interdependent, meaning an interruption at any single stage collapses the entire operation.[1][5]

The first phase, "Find," initiates the cycle by identifying that a potential target exists within a specific operational environment. This step relies heavily on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, ranging from orbital satellites to unmanned aerial systems. However, simply knowing a target exists is insufficient for an engagement. The "Fix" phase immediately follows, requiring operators to determine the target's precise geographic coordinates with enough fidelity to permit a strike.[1][3][4][5]

Once a target is fixed, the "Track" phase ensures that the asset is continuously monitored. This is particularly critical for mobile targets, as the time elapsed between the initial fix and the final engagement can render static coordinates useless. "Tracking the identified radar contact is mandatory to continue the dynamic decision-making process," notes the Headquarters, Department of the Army's manual on dynamic targeting.[1][5]

The transition from monitoring to action occurs during the "Target" phase. Here, commanders evaluate the tracked entity against the established Rules of Engagement, assess the potential for collateral damage, and select the appropriate weapon system to achieve the desired effect. This phase is highly labor- and decision-intensive, requiring legal and operational clearance before any kinetic action is authorized.[1][3][5]

Only after these four prerequisites are satisfied does the "Engage" phase commence. This is the physical application of force—the release of a munition or the execution of a non-kinetic effect, such as an electronic warfare jamming sequence. Finally, the cycle closes with the "Assess" phase, traditionally known as Bomb Damage Assessment. Analysts review post-strike imagery and sensor data to determine if the target was destroyed or if a re-strike is necessary, effectively feeding back into the "Find" phase if the objective was not met.[1][4][5]

When the F2T2EA model was formalized in the late 1990s under the guidance of General John Jumper, the primary metric for success was time. Jumper set an ambitious goal of reducing the kill chain to single-digit minutes. Prior to this initiative, the standard for time-critical targeting was starkly different: "less than 60 minutes, gotta be good; 0-30 minutes, gotta be lucky and good; less than 10 minutes, gotta be crazy," as described by Major Mike Benitez, a former Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency fellow.[2]

The system proved its efficacy during the opening weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom. On April 7, 2003, intelligence indicated that Saddam Hussein was located in a specific Baghdad neighborhood. At 2:48 p.m., a B-1 bomber was dynamically re-routed from its pre-planned mission. By 3:00 p.m., just 12 minutes later, the target was destroyed. This rapid execution validated the F2T2EA model, cementing it as the gold standard for joint force operations over the next two decades.[2]

Yet, 18 years after its widespread adoption, military strategists are increasingly questioning whether the linear nature of the kill chain is a liability. "Inescapably, all processes and concepts must be modernized or recapitalized to avoid obsolescence as underlying assumptions and variables inevitably change," Benitez argues. The rigid, sequential dependency of F2T2EA means that peer adversaries do not need to defeat the weapon itself; they only need to break one link in the chain—such as jamming the GPS signals required for the "Fix" phase or blinding the sensors used to "Track."[1][2]

This vulnerability has prompted a push to evolve the kill chain into a more resilient, multi-domain framework. Modern proposals suggest moving away from a linear chain toward a "kill web," where sensors and shooters are dynamically networked. If one tracking node is blinded, another can seamlessly provide the targeting data, bypassing the traditional sequential bottlenecks.[2][6]

Interestingly, the structural logic of the F2T2EA sequence has transcended kinetic warfare, finding utility in entirely different domains. In 2011, Lockheed Martin adapted the concept to create the Cyber Kill Chain, a seven-step framework designed to identify and halt network intrusions before data exfiltration occurs. By treating a cyberattack as a sequential process, network defenders can break the chain at the reconnaissance or delivery phases, neutralizing the threat early.[5]

The framework is even being applied to organizational management. Researchers at Air University have proposed using the F2T2EA cycle to identify and dismantle destructive leadership within military units. "By applying a military kill chain model used in dynamic targeting, we can develop the proper response to such destructive leadership," writes Lieutenant Colonel Vincent Bos of the Royal Netherlands Air Force. In this context, the "Find, Fix, and Track" phases involve collecting intelligence on toxic behavior, while the "Target and Engage" phases represent the implementation of tailored administrative solutions.[3]

Whether applied to a hypersonic missile, a network intrusion, or a toxic command climate, the fundamental premise of the kill chain remains unchanged: complex problems must be broken down into actionable, sequential steps. However, as the speed of warfare accelerates and adversaries develop new methods to disrupt the cycle, the U.S. military faces a critical inflection point. The challenge for the next decade will not be executing the F2T2EA sequence faster, but ensuring the chain remains unbroken in an increasingly contested environment.[2][3][5][6]