New Investigation Alleges Netanyahu Ignored Direct Warnings from UAE and Shin Bet Weeks Before October 7

On October 1, 2023, Shin Bet director Ronen Bar met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and recommended the targeted assassination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. According to a security source who confirmed the meeting's details, Bar warned that the domestic intelligence agency had identified Hamas preparing "something extreme," explicitly using the term "earthquake" to describe the impending threat. The Prime Minister did not accept the recommendation to strike the organization's senior leadership.[1]

The details of that meeting form part of a broader intelligence timeline published on Tuesday in a new investigation by journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval. The report, excerpted from their book "Hostages: 843 Days of Abandonment," alleges that the Israeli premier received multiple, specific warnings from both domestic security chiefs and regional allies in the weeks preceding the October 7 attacks, and compartmentalized the information away from his own defense establishment.[4][5]

The most prominent of the newly disclosed warnings originated from the United Arab Emirates. In late September 2023, roughly ten days before the attack, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed initiated an unusual 45-minute phone call to Netanyahu. During the conversation, the Emirati leader cautioned that Sinwar was planning a significant event that could lead to regional bloodshed and jeopardize the Abraham Accords.[4][5]

The intelligence underlying the UAE's warning reportedly stemmed from stalled indirect negotiations over the return of Israeli captives held in Gaza. When talks broke down in early September, Sinwar allegedly contacted a Fatah figure, telling him to pass a message to the Israelis that he was planning a "big surprise" and an "earthquake" if progress was not made. That message was relayed to an adviser to the UAE President, prompting the direct call to Jerusalem.[4]

Netanyahu reportedly received the Emirati warning calmly, assessing that Hamas intended to focus its operations in the West Bank rather than launching a cross-border invasion from Gaza. According to the investigation, the Prime Minister reassured bin Zayed but did not brief Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, or the heads of the Mossad and Shin Bet on the contents of the call.[3][5]

Both Halevi and Bar have since confirmed that they were never informed of the warning conveyed by the UAE president. The compartmentalization of this intelligence meant that the military and domestic security agencies continued their operations without the context of a direct threat assessment from a key regional partner.[5]

A parallel warning allegedly arrived from Cairo. Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel conveyed a similar message to the Prime Minister's Office regarding unusual Hamas preparations. The response returned to Cairo indicated that Israel believed it controlled the situation in Gaza and was concentrating its military forces in the Judea and Samaria regions.[5]

The publication of the investigation on Tuesday triggered immediate confirmations and condemnations from Israel's political opposition. Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett publicly verified the core claim regarding the Emirati backchannel. "The report published this morning that Netanyahu was warned 10 days before the October 7 massacre about Sinwar's intentions is true," Bennett stated, though he did not specify the source of his verification.[3]

Bennett accused his successor of "criminal negligence," arguing that Netanyahu failed to alert the security establishment, prepare the country for an attack, or convene the security cabinet. "He bears personal and direct responsibility for the failure that led to the deaths of thousands of Israelis on his watch," Bennett said.[3]

Opposition Leader Yair Lapid corroborated the atmosphere of mounting alarm in September 2023. Lapid noted that he had personally reviewed highly classified intelligence at the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on September 18, which prompted him to hold a press conference two days later warning the Israeli public of an impending security crisis. Lapid claimed that Egypt and the Shin Bet had made similar, repeated attempts to break through the Prime Minister's preconceptions.[2][6]

Former IDF Chief of Staff and Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot framed the new disclosures as evidence of a systemic leadership failure. "More and more signs indicate that Netanyahu led Israel blindly into the October 7 failure," Eisenkot said, emphasizing that the Prime Minister received dozens of warnings and ignored them all.[4]

The Prime Minister's Office issued a categorical denial of the investigation's claims regarding the UAE. In a statement released Tuesday, the office asserted that "Prime Minister Netanyahu did not speak with the president of the United Arab Emirates during the period in question and received no warning from him."[4]

The conflicting accounts strike at the core of the ongoing battle over accountability for the October 7 intelligence collapse. Netanyahu has previously published documents attributing the failure to the security bodies, claiming the IDF and Shin Bet consistently assessed that Hamas was deterred and recommended a policy of containment.[5]

Advocacy groups representing the victims of the attacks argue the new timeline shifts the focus of the accountability debate. The October Council, an organization of survivors and hostages' families, stated that arguing over what time the Prime Minister was awakened on the morning of the attack ignores the larger question of how many times regional and domestic actors attempted to wake the government in the preceding weeks.[5]

The disclosures are expected to intensify political pressure for the establishment of a state commission of inquiry. While military and intelligence agencies have begun internal probes into their operational failures, the political echelon has thus far resisted an independent, legally binding investigation into the decision-making processes that governed the weeks before the war.[3]